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The study examined whether test anxiety (TA) is related to impaired attentional networks
under emotional distraction. High and low test-anxious students completed a modified
version of the attention network test (ANT) in which emotional distracters, specifically
threat-related or neutral words, were embedded in centrally presented hollow arrows
in Experiment 1. Results showed a significant reduction in efficiency of the executive
attention in test-anxious students compared to controls when the fillers were threat/test-
related words. To evaluate the effect of the test adaptation, the original ANT, which
utilized no emotional distracter, was employed as a control task in Experiment 2. We
then consolidated the data on efficiency of attentional networks, which were derived
from both tasks. Contrasting the two tasks showed that TA reduced executive attention
in the revised task only, suggesting an enhanced sensitivity provided by the adaptation
from the original task. Taken together, these findings indicate that the attentional deficit
in test-anxious individuals represents a situation-related defect of a single component of
attention rather than an underlying structural and universal attentional deficit. The results
support the hypothesis of attentional control theory and contribute to the understanding
of attentional mechanisms in individuals with TA.
Keywords: test anxiety, emotional distraction, attention network test, executive attention, modulation
Introduction
Test anxiety (TA) has been described as a set of phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral
responses that accompany concerns about possible negative consequences or failure in an exam or
similar evaluative situations (Zeidner, 1998). It has been found that TA was related to susceptibility
or attentional bias to threat distraction (Mathews, 1993; Keogh and French, 2001; Putwain et al.,
2011). Hence, TA was deemed to induce a type of information processing (Zeidner, 1998),
concretely, attentional deﬁcit (Calvo et al., 1994). Considering that attention has been researched
as a unitary idea in the past (Raz and Buhle, 2006), it is not entirely clear whether susceptibility or
bias to threat-related distracters is due to underlying structural and universal deﬁcits of attention
or due to situational defect of a single component of attention.
It is important to note that attention characteristics in test-anxious individuals have been
examined in a variety of studies using diﬀerent paradigms, such as the dot probe task
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(Putwain et al., 2011), cue-target task (Keogh and French, 2001;
Liu et al., 2015), central cue task (Chen et al., 2011), negative
priming task (Shi et al., 2014), Stroop task (Hopko et al., 2002;
Kofman et al., 2006; Lawson, 2006; Bradley et al., 2010; Geen and
Kaiser, unpublished manuscript), and switching task (Kofman
et al., 2006). The results from these tests are hard to compare
directly due to diﬀerent aspects of attention that were tested by
the diﬀerent tasks (Miyake et al., 2000; Joormann, 2004; Derrfuss
et al., 2005; Mottaghy et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2008; Finucane
et al., 2010). Therefore, it is critical to employ a comprehensive
and systematic measurement to inspect potential attentional
deﬁcits in test-anxious people thoroughly.
Among the various instruments to assess attention
characteristics, the attention network test (ANT) is a popular
tool that was designed as a quick and simple computerized
task based on a neural network model of attention (Posner and
Petersen, 1990; Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 2001; Posner
et al., 2007; Petersen and Posner, 2012). According to this model,
the attention system of the human brain can be divided into
three functionally and anatomically independent networks,
each with corresponding functions. For example, the alerting
network allows producing andmaintaining optimal vigilance; the
orienting network is focused on the ability to prioritize sensory
input by selecting a modality or location; and the executive
control network allows for the monitoring and resolution of
conﬂict between responses. These networks used to be analyzed
separately until a single task (ANT) was created through the
combination of a ﬂanker paradigm and cueing task with fully
randomized conditions within blocks (Dennis et al., 2008;
Macleod et al., 2010). Participants were instructed to press either
the left or right key of the keyboard (or mouse) depending on
whether the target, a central arrow presented above or below
the ﬁxation point, pointed to the left or the right, respectively.
Through the integration of separate chronometric analyses
for each attention network, the ANT can tap into early and
late stages (components) of information processing (Raz and
Buhle, 2006; Galvao-Carmona et al., 2014). It has been widely
accepted as a useful, accurate, and reliable measure of function
of the three attentional subsystems in light of the evidence from
various behavioral and brain imaging studies (Petersen and
Posner, 2012). The ANT was also applied to explore individual
diﬀerences in Caucasians (Matthews and Zeidner, 2012), and
Chinese (Du et al., 2006).
Recently, four versions of the emotional ANT have been
developed to explore the eﬀects of emotional distracters on
attentional functions. In earlier versions, each trial was preceded
by an emotional picture presented for 50 ms (Dennis and Chen,
2007), or every sixth trial was preceded by an emotional picture
presented for 6 s (Finucane et al., 2010). In more recent versions,
the cues (asterisks) were replaced by emotional pictures (Cohen
et al., 2011) or words (Gómez-Íñiguez et al., 2014). All of these
tasks are useful, as they provide insight into the eﬀect of emotion
on attentional processing. However, we are skeptical of their
sensitivity to diﬀerentiate between high and low test-anxious
people under emotional distraction. The main reason for this
insensitivity may lie in the time lag between emotional and
target processing, which can help test-anxious people to summon
extra resources and thus compensate for potential performance
impairments caused by the resource preemption of emotional
processing (Eysenck et al., 2007). More concretely, the extra
resources may compensate for depleted self-control resources
which help test-anxious people regulate the disruptive eﬀects
of emotional stimuli on subsequent cognitive processes (Cohen
et al., 2011; Bertrams et al., 2013).
In the present study, we developed a novel version of the ANT
by embedding a task-irrelevant distracter (Chinese two-character
word diﬀering in valence and relevance to the examinations)
into the target (central hollow arrow). Due to the new, yet the
same, perceptual object which was formed by the distracter and
target (Berti and Schröger, 2001), participants were forced to
attend to the distracter which was presented in the whole object
(Leiva et al., 2015); consequently, visual distraction eﬀects were
obtained (Berti and Schröger, 2004). The adaptation allows us to
induce simultaneous competition for attention resources between
the target and emotional distracter and serves as a possible
source of emotional interference (illustrated in Figure 1). More
importantly, TA individuals had no supplemental resources in
our modiﬁed ANT compared to the previous revised ANTs, due
to the simultaneous presentation of distracters and targets, to
compensate for their potential performance impairments caused
by the emotional distraction. Hence, our modiﬁed ANT might
tap into the eﬀect of TA on attentional functions.
The aim of this study was twofold. First, we examined whether
TA is related to impaired attentional networks under emotional
distraction. In Experiment 1, we employed the revised ANT
to explore the eﬀects of emotional distraction on attentional
functions. Second, we assessed the validity of this revised task
to measure attentional networks in high versus low test-anxious
students. For this purpose we proceeded in two steps: (i)
replicating the original ANT in Experiment 2, and (ii) comparing
the data on eﬃciency of attentional networks, which were
recorded in the two diﬀerent situations, that is, derived from the
original (conditions free from emotional distracters) and revised
tasks (conditions under emotional distracters).
Hypothesis 1: Threat/test-related distracters embedded in
targets are expected to induce stronger attention interference
eﬀects (i.e., lower eﬃciency of alerting, orienting, and executive





Forty (19 males) college students (see Table 1) were selected
from a total of 422 (197 males), aged 18–26 years (M = 20.38,
SD = 1.12), according to their scores of the Chinese version
of the Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI; Spielberger, 1980; Wang,
2003). Those falling into the highest and lowest quarters of the
score distributions were selected as the 40 candidates (high-
anxious students and controls, respectively). All participants
(native Chinese speakers) reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and right-handedness. None of them suﬀered from
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure of revised ANT (based on Fan et al., 2002). (A) Cue conditions, (B) Arrow conditions, (C) Filler word conditions, and
(D) An example of the procedure.
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristic of subjects in the two experiments.











(A)Revised ANT Control 10 10 20.45 (0.95) 25.10 (2.51) 38.70 (8.02) 35.50 (5.31) 3.50 (3.36)
Experiment 9 11 20.20 (1.06) 47.75 (5.88) 49.60 (6.92) 44.85 (7.31) 9.60 (4.94)
(B) Original ANT Control 9 10 19.89 (0.88) 25.39 (2.64) 38.37 (7.93) 33.63 (7.31) 2.79 (2.02)
Experiment 10 11 19.90 (0.94) 49.65 (8.25) 50.71 (7.71) 42.33 (7.37) 10.67 (5.09)
psychosis, neuropathy or had experienced drug abuse. They took
nomedications or alcohol in the 3 days before the experiment. All
participants signed the written informed consent, and they were




The Chinese version of the 20-items TAI (Wang, 2003), including
the two concepts worry and emotionality, was used to measure
TA. On a four-point scale, participants rated the frequency with
which they experienced speciﬁc symptoms of anxiety before,
during, and after exams. Cronbach’s alpha of the Chinese Version
of the TAI (total) in this study (0.90) was comparable with
that (0.92) reported in a previous study (Spielberger, 1980); the
corresponding values for the worry and emotionality subscale
were 0.80 and 0.84, respectively (Wang, 2003).
State anxiety and trait anxiety
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983),
including the A-Trait and A-State subscale, was used to
measure trait and state anxiety separately. On a four-point
scale, participants rated the frequency of speciﬁc symptoms
they experienced before in the A-Trait subscale or rated the
correspondence between the descriptions and their current
feelings in the A-State subscale. A score of 20 indicates the
absence of anxiety and a score of 80 indicates high anxiety in
each subscale. The Chinese version of the STAI (Tsoi et al., 1986),
showing high internal consistency, was used in the present study.
Shek (1988) reported that the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90 and 0.81
for A-State and A-Trait subscale, respectively.
Depression
The short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck
et al., 1974, 1988) was used to measure the respondent’s
current depressive state on a four-point scale. The inventory
taps symptoms and attitudes frequently displayed by depressed
psychiatric patients and relatively infrequently by non-depressed
psychiatric patients (Beck et al., 1961). The Chinese version of
the BDI (Chan and Tsoi, 1984) was used in the present study. The
overall Cronbach’s alpha was 0.86 (Shek, 1990), indicating good
reliability.
Vocabulary assessment
One thousand and forty-six two-character Chinese words
(including 476 nouns, 359 verbs, and 211 adjectives) with
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frequency counts below 1000 were chosen from a frequency
list of a 20-million word corpus of the Chinese Linguistics
Data [DB/OL] (Institute of Applied Linguistics, 2009) by three
candidates for the doctoral degree in psychology. These words
were divided into four groups with approximately the same
amount of words, and the 422 previously mentioned participants
completed the assessment at diﬀerent times. A list of words was
presented on the screen one-by-one (programmed in E-prime
1.1), and the participants assigned a value from 1 to 7 according
to the word’s threat potential and relevance to examinations.
Higher values indicate that the words were more threatening (or
relevant).
These words were then ranked according to their values
on threat and exam relevance. Those falling into the highest
and lowest 10% of their respective score distributions were
selected as candidate items. After controlling for frequency and
stroke, we obtained 64 two-character Chinese words. The various
questionnaires listed previously were performed in the 3 weeks
before the ﬁnal exams, except for the measurement on state
anxiety. In order to assess the test–retest reliability of the 64-
items vocabulary, a sample of 79 college students (26males), aged
18–23 years (M = 19.96, SD = 1.13), returned to complete the
assessment of the words after 2 weeks.
The Modified ANT
Stimuli, apparatus, and design
The stimuli consisted of a row of ﬁve visually presented
horizontal rectangles, with arrowheads pointing leftward or
rightward. The combination of arrowheads and rectangles
yielded hollow arrows. The central arrow (leftward or rightward)
was considered the target and was ﬂanked by two arrows on
each side that could point in the same direction as the target
(congruent trials) or in the opposite direction (incongruent
trials) or by rectangles (neutral condition; see the three ﬂanker
conditions in Figure 1B). These ﬁve-items combos covered an
area of 10 mm × 6 mm. The eﬃciency of executive attention was
indexed by deterioration in reaction time (RT) in incongruent
trials compared to congruent trials.
Within the centrally presented hollow arrows, one of the
64 two-character Chinese words, which varied in terms of
valence (threat versus non-threat) and relevance to examinations
(relevant versus irrelevant), was presented as ﬁller (see Figure 1C
andTable 2). For example, “sweater” was considered an irrelevant
and non-threat ﬁller; “ferocious,” “dictionary,” and “exam” were
considered irrelevant and threat, relevant and non-threat, and
relevant and threat ﬁllers, respectively. The ﬁller word was set in
Song typeface with a font size of 9 points and changed randomly
between trials.
In some trials, there were asterisk cues before the stimulus
presentation, indicating when or where the target would occur,
thereby providing a basis for the participant to direct attention
to the cued location (Posner, 1980). The cue conditions (no-cue,
central-cue, double-cue, and spatial-cue condition) which have
been described in Fan et al. (2002), are illustrated in Figure 1A.
For the no-cue (no asterisk appeared, participants saw only
the ﬁxation point for 100 ms), center-cue (asterisk appeared
superimposed over the ﬁxation point), and double-cue trials
(asterisks appeared both above and below the ﬁxation point), the
target locations were always uncertain. The cue was only valid
for the spatial-cue trials (asterisk appeared either above or below
the ﬁxation point), which meant that it was at the target position.
The eﬃciency of alerting attention was indexed by improvement
in mean RT in double-cue trials compared to no-cue trials. The
eﬃciency of orienting attention was indexed by improvement in
mean RT in spatial-cue trials compared to center-cue trials.
Forty-eight conditions (4 cue conditions × 3 ﬂanker types × 2
relevance conditions × 2 threat conditions) were assigned to the
repeated testing conditions, with the assignment counterbalanced
between experimental (high-anxiety participants) and control
group. All four cue conditions were equally probable in the task,
as were all three ﬂanker types. Targets appeared above and below
the ﬁxation point with equal probability. The words varying in
valence and relevance and were randomly distributed among the
diﬀerent cue conditions and ﬂanker types. Group condition was
the between-subject factor; the within-subject factors included
cue, ﬂanker, and ﬁller conditions. The generation of the stimuli
and collection of responses were controlled using the E-prime 1.1
software (Schneider et al., 2002) running under Windows XP on
a PC with a 1.6 GHz processor and displayed on a 17-inch ﬂat-
panel screen (resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels and refresh rate
of 85 Hz).
Procedures
Subjects sat about 90 cm away from the screen in a silent and
dimly illuminated room, and their heads were stabilized by the
headrest of an armchair. Each trial began with a ﬁxation point
presented for 400–1,600 ms in the center of the screen. A cue was
presented for 100 ms, and 400 ms later, a stimulus-combination
was presented. Subjects were asked to identify the direction of
the central arrow by pressing the left mouse button for the left
direction and the right mouse button for the right direction.
They were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as
possible.
The stimulus-combination was presented for up to 1,700 ms,
or until the subject responded. The total duration of each trial was
4,000ms. The ﬁxation point appeared at the same location during
the whole trial. The stimulus-combination, which subtended an
area of 3.18◦ × 0.38◦ of visual angle, was presented 0.25◦ above
or below the ﬁxation point. The cue was presented at similar
locations except for the central cue condition. The experimental
process is shown in Figure 1D. The experiment consisted of
a 24-trial full-feedback practice block (RT, whether answer was
correct, and cumulative success rate) followed by three blocks
of 96 feedback-free trials each (4 cue conditions × 2 combo
locations × 2 target directions × 3 ﬂanker types × 2 repetitions),
with a 2-min break between blocks. The A-State subscale of
the STAI was completed either before or after the revised ANT,
with the order counterbalanced between groups. The tasks were
completed individually 1 week before the ﬁnal exams and usually
lasted about 40–50 min.
Analysis
The questionnaire scores were compared between groups using
Fisher’s exact test. The data for the 64 words were analyzed by a 2
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Relevance Threat Frequency Strokes
Irrelevant and non-threat(16) 11 2 3 1.55 (0.18) 1.29 (0.20) 33.50 (22.33) 17.38 (3.91)
Irrelevant and threat(16) 3 4 9 1.77 (0.18) 2.86 (0.24) 33.50 (21.62) 17.31 (5.56)
Relevant and non-threat(16) 9 5 2 3.48 (0.40) 1.37 (0.18) 33.25 (28.63) 17.12 (4.23)
Relevant and threat(16) 3 10 3 3.65 (0.58) 2.94 (0.28) 33.62 (35.09) 17.81 (4.64)
(relevance condition) × 2 (threat condition) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with relevance-rating and threat-rating scores serving
as dependent variables. In addition, a classical one-way ANOVA
of word frequency and stroke was carried out on these diﬀerent
word groups.
We followed the method of Fan et al. (2002) to analyze
the eﬀects of cues, ﬂankers, and groups on choice RTs. Two
participants were excluded from the analysis for outlier RTs in
more than 20% trials (Z-score> 3). Subsequently, 38 participants
were screened to remove trials (1.58%) with responses faster than
200ms and trials with RTs 3 SD greater than an individual’smean.
The remaining RT data from the correct trials (95.56%) were
pooled as a function of cue and ﬂanker condition. We carried
out a 2 (group condition) × 4 (cue condition) × 3 (ﬂanker
type) × 4 (ﬁller-emotion condition) mixed ANOVA of the RT
data.
To examine the eﬀect of emotions on attention, we
reconstructed the current formula for calculating the eﬃciency
of the attentional network (Fan et al., 2002) by computing the RT
diﬀerence between the emotional targets and neutral targets (i.e.,
targets contained irrelevant and non-threat words). The formulae
for calculating the alerting eﬀect under diﬀerent emotional
conditions were as follows: Alertingneutral = RTno−cue,neutral –
RTdouble−cue,neutral representing the beneﬁt of the target
response speed because of presence versus absence of cues
without spatial information in neutral trials. Alertingirrelevant
and threat = RTno−cue,neutral – RTdouble−cue,irrelevant, and threat
representing the beneﬁt of the target response speed because of
alerting in irrelevant and threat trials compared to neutral trials.
Alertingrelevant and threat = RTno−cue,neutral – RTdouble−cue,relevant,
and threat representing the beneﬁt of the target response speed
because of alerting in relevant and threat trials compared to
neutral trials. Alertingrelevant and non−threat = RTno−cue, neutral –
RTdouble−cue, relevant, and non−threat representing the beneﬁt of
the target response speed because of alerting in relevant and
non-threat trials compared to neutral trials.
The formulae for calculating the orienting eﬀect
under diﬀerent emotional conditions were as follows:
Orientingneutral = RTcentral−cue,neutral – RTspatial−cue,neutral
representing the beneﬁt of the target response speed because
of presence versus absence of cues with spatial information in
neutral trials. Orientingirrelevant and threat = RTcentral−cue,neutral –
RTspatial−cue,irrelevant, and threat representing the beneﬁt of
the target response speed because of orienting in irrelevant
and threat trials compared to neutral trials. Orientingrelevant
and threat = RTcentral−cue,neutral – RTspatial−cue,relevant, and threat
representing the beneﬁt of the target response speed because
of alerting in relevant and threat trials compared to neutral
trials. Orientingrelevant and non−threat = RTcentral−cue,neutral –
RTspatial−cue,relevant, and non−threat representing the beneﬁt of
the target response speed because of alerting in relevant and
non-threat trials compared to neutral trials.
The formulae for calculating the conﬂict eﬀect
under diﬀerent emotional conditions were as follows:
Conﬂictneutral = RTincongruent,neutral – RTcongruent,neutral
representing the cost of the target response speed because
of incongruence versus congruence in neutral trials.
Conﬂictirrelevant and threat = RTincongruent,irrelevant, and threat central –
RTcongruent,neutral representing the cost of the target response
speed because of conﬂict in irrelevant and threat trials compared
to neutral trials. Conﬂictrelevant and threat = RTincongruent,relevant,
and threat – RTcongruent,neutral representing the cost of the
target response speed because of conﬂict in relevant and
threat trials compared to neutral trials. Conﬂictrelevant and
non−threat = RTincongruent,relevant, and non−threat – RTcongruent,neutral
representing the cost of the target response speed because of
conﬂict in relevant and non-threat trials compared to neutral
trials. These diﬀerences indicate that the higher the value of the
alerting and orienting eﬀect, the more eﬃcient the attentional
network is. When it comes to the conﬂicting eﬀect, the reverse is
true (Fan et al., 2002).
We suspected that there might be a close relationship between
anxiety sensitivity and depression (Goldenberg et al., 1996; Taylor
et al., 1996; Weems et al., 1997), and that trait and state anxiety
levels might modulate individual attentional network eﬃciency
(Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010). We hence carried out three
separate 2 (group condition) × 2 (ﬁller relevance condition) × 2
(ﬁller valence condition) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs)
by entering all three covariates (trait anxiety, anxiety, and
depression scores), with alerting, orienting, and conﬂicting eﬀects




As shown in Table 1A, test-anxious subjects in the revised
ANT had signiﬁcantly greater TA [t(39) = 15.09, p < 0.001]
than controls. The same result was obtained for the subscales
of the STAI [trait t(39) = 4.54, p < 0.001; state t(39) = 4.49,
p < 0.001]. These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that
describes TA as a situation speciﬁc anxiety (Spielberger and
Vagg, 1987). Furthermore, test-anxious subjects had signiﬁcantly
greater depression levels than controls [t(39) = 4.77, p < 0.001].
This result conﬁrmed the close relationship between anxiety
sensitivity and depression (Goldenberg et al., 1996; Taylor et al.,
1996; Weems et al., 1997).
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Filler Word Results
The results of the vocabulary assessment are shown in Table 2
and reveal a main eﬀect of relevance [F(1,420) = 415.07, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.87], with rating levels signiﬁcantly greater for test-relevant
than test-irrelevant words, as well as a main eﬀect of valence
[F(1,420) = 759.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93], with rating levels
signiﬁcantly greater for threat than non-threat words. Thus, the
four diﬀerent word groups indeed varied in either relevance or
valence. It is also important to note that there were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in word frequency [F(1,421) = 0.00, p = 1.00] and
stroke [F(1,421) = 0.06, p = 0.98] between the diﬀerent word
groups.
The intra-scale reliability of each conceptual domain was
determined by computing Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcients. Values
of 0.94 (for relevance) and 0.94 (for valence) were taken
as indicating satisfactory reliability. Test–retest repeatability
correlation coeﬃcients for the two domain scores were highly
signiﬁcant (p < 0.001). Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcients were 0.81
and 0.83 for the relevance and valence subscale, respectively.
Effects of Cues, Flankers, and Fillers on Choice
Reaction Times
Table 3 summarizes RT data pooled from correct trials as a
function of cue, ﬂanker, and ﬁller-emotion condition. The results
replicated the ﬁndings of Fan et al. (2002). Statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were found for the cue [F(3,34) = 122.52, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.77] and ﬂanker [F(2,35) = 508.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93]
main eﬀects and for their interaction [F(6,31) = 5.04, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.12; see Figure 2]. The simple eﬀect analysis suggested
that, regardless of the cue condition, subjects took more time to
react under incongruent ﬂankers, and this eﬀect was enhanced
under the alerting cue conditions (central and double cues).
Considering that both cue and ﬂanker eﬀects are in line with the
principles of the ANT design, attentional network functions can
be thus formulated (Fan et al., 2002).
The results of the ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of group [F(1,36) = 0.91, p = 0.35]. However, the ANOVA
revealed a signiﬁcant ﬁller-emotion main eﬀect [F(3,34) = 10.89,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23]. This eﬀect was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant
group × ﬁller-emotion interaction [F(3,34) = 12.58, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.26]. Contrasting high and low TA groups showed that
targets embedded with emotional (i.e., irrelevant and threat,
relevant and non-threat, and relevant and threat) versus neutral
words prolonged the RT only in the TA group, suggesting that
controls were free from the emotional interference. The eﬀect of
ﬁller-emotion was also qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant group × ﬁller-
emotion × cue × ﬂanker interaction [F(18,19) = 1.70, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.05]. Further analysis showed that students with TA took
more time for dealing with targets embedded with irrelevant and
threat words in conﬂict trials under center-cue [F(1,36) = 6.63,
TABLE 3 | Reaction time (RT) data (mean and SD) under each condition.
Flanker Filler emotion Group Cue condition
No cue Center cue Double cue Spatial cue Total
Congruent IRNT Control 439 (48) 436 (33) 390 (49) 384 (53) 411 (43)
Experiment 448 (54) 413 (36) 394 (43) 390 (49) 410 (45)
IRT Control 448 (50) 441 (54) 392 (56) 378 (52) 408 (48)
Experiment 452 (59) 415 (61) 406 (57) 394 (56) 416 (50)
RNT Control 444 (60) 443 (44) 396 (57) 376 (50) 407 (52)
Experiment 450 (56) 411 (36) 411 (46) 387 (43) 414 (46)
RT Control 445 (46) 479 (41) 400 (54) 380 (50) 406 (46)
Experiment 447 (41) 424 (49) 403 (50) 396 (45) 414 (40)
Incongruent IRNT Control 505 (54) 484 (48) 469 (49) 455 (55) 478 (52)
Experiment 506 (56) 498 (51) 470 (41) 466 (52) 489 (49)
IRT Control 494 (75) 506 (63) 469 (54) 445 (68) 479 (59)
Experiment 547 (70) 558 (62) 542 (49) 503 (60) 503 (51)
RNT Control 506 (63) 494 (51) 461 (54) 445 (50) 478 (52)
Experiment 526 (63) 505 (54) 499 (47) 482 (48) 497 (45)
RT Control 494 (51) 444 (52) 479 (56) 461 (58) 478 (50)
Experiment 520 (51) 527 (41) 520 (59) 502 (51) 496 (46)
Neutral IRNT Control 444 (52) 440 (42) 402 (46) 380 (42) 416 (44)
Experiment 440 (46) 422 (49) 409 (33) 393 (46) 415 (41)
IRT Control 445 (51) 440 (45) 392 (50) 372 (45) 412 (49)
Experiment 455 (46) 419 (54) 413 (41) 397 (45) 421 (44)
RNT Control 441 (47) 438 (35) 409 (47) 378 (47) 417 (42)
Experiment 455 (45) 417 (36) 403 (36) 392 (40) 417 (37)
RT Control 439 (37) 414 (58) 395 (49) 376 (40) 406 (42)
Experiment 438 (44) 416 (49) 402 (44) 386 (34) 411 (39)
IRNT, irrelevant and non-threat; IRT, irrelevant and threat; RNT, relevant and non-threat; RT, relevant and threat.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean RT from correct trials as a function of cue and
flanker condition under emotional distraction.
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.16] and no-cue [F(1,36) = 5.17, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.13] conditions, compared to controls. The same was true
for irrelevant and threat [F(1,36) = 7.52, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.17],
relevant and non-threat [F(1,36) = 5.26, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.13], and
relevant and threat [F(1,36) = 5.13, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.13] ﬁllers
in conﬂict trials under spatial-cue conditions. Similarly, in the
double-cue conditions, the corresponding ANOVA values were
as follows: F(1,36) = 18.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34; F(1,36) = 5.23,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.13; F(1,36) = 4.91, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.12.
Efficiency of Attentional Networks
Table 4 shows the eﬃciency of subjects’ alerting, orienting, and
executive attention networks in these emotional tasks. There were
no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of group [F(1,33) = 2.91, p = 0.10],
relevance [F(1,33) = 0.05, p = 0.82], or valence [F(1,33) = 1.80,
p = 0.19] in the eﬃciency of alerting. No signiﬁcant interactions
(all four F’s < 1.14) were found. We found similar results for
the eﬃciency of orienting; the corresponding F-values for group,
relevance, and valence were 1.02 (p = 0.32), 1.00 (p = 0.32), and
0.74 (p = 0.40), respectively. Again, there were no signiﬁcant
interactions (all four F’s < 1.48). These results suggest that
despite the emotionality of the targets, there was no diﬀerence in
alerting or orienting eﬃciency between test-anxious and control
individuals.
The ANCOVA for executive attention revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of relevance [F(1,33) = 9.08, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.22)
and a marginally signiﬁcant main eﬀect of group [F(1,33) = 3.69,
p = 0.06, η2p = 0.10]; however, no main eﬀect of valence was
observed [F(1,33) = 0.67, p = 0.42]. Importantly, these eﬀects
were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant group × valence interaction
[F(1,33) = 4.41, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.12] and a marginally signiﬁcant
group × relevance interaction [F(1,33) = 3.63, p = 0.06,
η2p = 0.10]. The simple eﬀect analysis revealed that the TA
group (M = 93.20 ± 7.14) was more impaired on executive
attention than controls (M = 64.97 ± 6.63) when the ﬁllers were
threat words compared with non-threat words (see Figure 3A).
The same was true when the ﬁller words were test-relevant
(MTA = 92.42 ± 7.13 versus Mcontrols = 62.53 ± 6.14; see
Figure 3B). These results suggest that test-anxious individuals
showed lower eﬃciency of executive attention than controls
especially when they were exposed to a situation involving
threat/test-related information.
To validate the eﬀect of the modiﬁed ANT, we introduced
Experiment 2 in which the original ANT was employed.
Considering the ﬁndings from Experiment 1 and the evidence
indicating that elementary cognitive operations may be intact in
individuals with anxiety and depression in the conditions that are
free from emotional distracters (Airaksinen et al., 2005; Pardo
et al., 2006; Preiss et al., 2010), we expected that the revised
task would be more sensitive to TA than the original ANT when
measuring executive attention.
Hypothesis 2: Emotional distraction (i.e., revised) task is
expected to reduce executive rather than alerting/orienting
attention in contrast to distraction-free (i.e., original) task in high




Another 40 (19 males) students of the subject pool of 422 original
participants (see Table 1B) were assigned to the original ANT.
The basic requirements for their participation were the same as
those for Experiment 1.
Measures
Measures were the same as those in Experiment 1.
The Original ANT
Stimuli, apparatus, and design
Stimuli were diﬀerent from Experiment 1, for example, black
lines replaced rectangles, thus yielding solid arrows or arrow-line
combinations (see Figure 4). In addition, no word was used as
ﬁller. The combination subtended an area of 3.08◦ of visual angle
and appeared either 1.06◦ above or below the ﬁxation point. The
cue conditions and the apparatus were the same as for the revised
ANT. More details are given in Fan et al. (2002).
Procedures
The procedure was the same as described by Fan et al. (2002).
Brieﬂy, participants viewed the stimuli from a distance of 65 cm
under four cue conditions and two ﬂanker conditions. They were
instructed to identify the direction of the centrally presented
arrow and to respond as fast and as accurately as possible.
Responses were collected via two mouse buttons. A session
consisted of a 24-trial practice block and three experimental
blocks. Each experimental block consisted of 96 trials (48
conditions, as described in Experiment 1, with two repetitions).
The presentation of trials was in a random order. Again, the
A-State subscale of the STAI was completed either before or after
the revisedANT, with the order counterbalanced between groups.
Analysis
Questionnaire analyses were the same as those in Experiment
1. We followed the method of Fan et al. (2002) to calculate
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TABLE 4 | Alerting, orienting, and executive effects (mean RTs and SD) under emotional distraction.
Index Alerting (ms) Orienting (ms) Executive (ms)
IRNT IRT RNT RT IRNT IRT RNT RT IRNT IRT RNT RT
Control (M) 43.68 46.51 46.83 36.04 35.75 36.16 43.40 36.10 67.57 68.32 67.56 67.37
Control (SD) 27.94 28.51 29.76 23.70 26.23 33.24 26.61 30.13 24.61 26.97 25.53 21.46
Experiment (M) 39.05 37.92 39.09 41.59 29.74 26.26 26.87 30.90 78.94 93.77 87.62 86.24
Experiment (SD) 39.01 29.96 26.76 34.59 29.09 34.70 29.19 27.20 24.92 34.64 30.41 28.94
IRNT, irrelevant and non-threat; IRT, irrelevant and threat; RNT, relevant and non-threat; RT, relevant and threat.
FIGURE 3 | The interaction between group and valence/relevance for executive attention in the revised ANT (∗p < 0.05). (A) Interaction between group
and valence, (B) Interaction between group and relevance.
FIGURE 4 | Experimental procedure of original ANT (adapted from Fan et al., 2002). (A) Cue conditions, (B) Stimuli without emotion interference, and (C) An
example of the procedure.
eﬃciency of executive attention based on the RT data from
the original ANT. The formulae were as follows: alerting
eﬀect=RTno−cue – RTdouble−cue, orienting eﬀect=RTcenter−cue –
RTspatial−cue, conﬂicting eﬀect = RTincongruent – RTcongruent. After
consolidating the data on eﬃciency of attentional networks,
which derived from the original and revised ANT (Experiment
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1), we then carried out three separate 2 (task type) × 2 (group
condition) ANCOVAs by entering all three covariates (trait
anxiety, anxiety, and depression scores), with alerting, orienting,
and conﬂicting eﬀects as dependent variables.
Results and Discussion
Questionnaire Results
We observed similar results in demographic characteristics of
the subjects compared to those of Experiment 1. As shown in
Table 1B, test-anxious subjects had signiﬁcantly higher levels
of TA [t(38) = 12.40, p < 0.001], trait anxiety [t(38) = 4.99,
p< 0.001], state anxiety [t(38) = 3.74, p< 0.001], and depression
[t(38) = 6.30, p< 0.001] than controls.
The Effects of the Revised ANT
Figure 5 shows the eﬃciency of subjects’ alerting, orienting,
and executive attention in the diﬀerent tasks. Although no
main eﬀect of group [F(1,71) = 3.21, p = 0.08] was found for
the eﬃciency of executive attention, the ANCOVA yielded a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of task type [F(1,71) = 20.30, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.22] and a signiﬁcant interaction between group
and task type [F(1,71) = 4.20, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.06]. The
simple eﬀect analysis suggested that the eﬃciency of executive
attention in high TA individuals (M = 85.34 ± 6.66) was
signiﬁcantly lower than that of controls (M = 59.38 ± 6.09)
in the revised task, while no diﬀerence between groups was
found in the original task (MTAgroup = 99.23 ± 6.07 versus
Mcontrols = 96.64 ± 6.38). The results indicated that the
adaptation of the ANT enhanced its sensitivity to TA when
measuring executive attention.
There was no signiﬁcant group main eﬀect [F(1,71) = 0.05,
p = 0.82] or interaction between task type and group
[F(1,71) = 0.32, p = 0.57] for the eﬃciency of alerting attention.
The same was true when applying the analysis to the eﬃciency
of orienting attention; the corresponding ANCOVA values were
F(1,71) = 0.01, p = 0.92 and F(1,71) = 0.02, p = 0.90. In
addition, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found between groups
when comparing the eﬃciency scores of executive [F(1,71) = 0.07,
p = 0.79], alerting [F(1,71) = 0.28, p = 0.60], or orienting
FIGURE 5 | The efficiency of attentional networks in different tasks
(∗p < 0.05).
[F(1,71) = 0.02, p = 0.88] attention that derived from the original
task. The results indicated that performance in the original ANT
was insensitive to the level of TA.
General Discussion
As we expected, test-anxious students showed a signiﬁcant
deﬁcit in the executive attention network when they were
faced with threat/test-related distracters (Experiment 1). This
result is consistent with event-related potential (ERP) ﬁndings,
indicating that the processing of negative emotions was linked
to decrements in executive attention in the high trait-anxiety
group (Dennis and Chen, 2007). The current result also supports
ﬁndings of a previous study using a modiﬁed Stroop color-
naming task, which found that test-anxious individuals took
longer to respond to test-threat words compared to controls
(Lawson, 2006). In fact, various studies employing diﬀerent
tasks, which tapped diﬀerent aspects of control processing, also
reached the conclusion that threat-related information negatively
aﬀected executive function of anxious individuals (Bishop et al.,
2004; Wieser et al., 2009); considering that eﬀortful control,
especially behavioral or attentional control, is strongly related
to the construct of executive function (Muris and Ollendick,
2005).
Both Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that impaired executive
attention in test-anxious students was only related to a speciﬁc
situation, which involved emotional, in particular threat/test-
related distracters. This may be due to the poor stability of the
attention bias in diﬀerent situations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). For
example, individuals with trait anxiety were more sensitive to
threat stimuli in stressful situations (Mogg et al., 1997), and state
anxiety was related to the attentional narrowing of negative aﬀect
(Rowe et al., 2007). In the present study, incongruent ﬂanker
displays represent the high-conﬂict condition (congruent ﬂanker
displays, in contrast, represent the low conﬂict conditions), and
conﬂict is associated with stress (Mann, 1992; Dehais et al., 2012).
Moreover, time pressure might also decrease the eﬃciency of
attentional allocation (Assink et al., 2015). On these grounds,
we speculate that the overlapping eﬀects of the ﬂanker conﬂict
and the resource competition between targets and ﬁllers under
time pressure (upper limit of 1,700 ms) increased the stress level
in conﬂict conditions compared with non-conﬂict conditions.
Compared to the controls, test-anxious students perceived more
stress or higher pressure, which triggered a more distinct
attentional bias toward threat/test-related distracters or evoked
attentional narrowing of negative emotions. This consequently
caused delayed identiﬁcation of the targets in conﬂict trials, which
was reﬂected as executive impairment in test-anxious students
compared to controls.
Another possible explanation stems from the study of
Mathews and MacLeod (2005), which demonstrated that
anxious people apply a top–down activation strategy due to
vigilance but have diﬃculty inhibiting the unexpected stimulus-
related bottom–up activation. On the one hand, it has been
found that the goal-directed attentional system (i.e., top–
down activation) could regulate the stimulus-driven attentional
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system, for example, a threat bias could be moderated by
attentional control (Derryberry and Reed, 2002), which decreased
the disruptive eﬀect of negative cues (Cohen et al., 2011).
Accordingly, the application of top–down activation strategies
may have regulated the impact of threat distracters (i.e.,
reduced attentional bias toward threats) on alerting/orienting
attention, which is primarily related to vigilance, in test-anxious
students.
On the other hand, the response to multiple stress conditions
(due to the design of our modiﬁed ANT) during conﬂict trials
might not only deplete the self-control resources in test-anxious
students under emotional distraction, but might make it hard
to replenish resources as well, hence weakening the inhibitions
for negative distraction during task performance (Cohen et al.,
2011). Alternatively, the depleted self-control resources could
make it diﬃcult to suppress the “pop-out” eﬀect induced by
unintended threat distraction (Bertrams et al., 2013), as “bottom–
up” sensory driven mechanisms were active at the moment.
Therefore, TA subjects’ target identiﬁcation was delayed to a
greater degree by threat/test-related distracters in incongruent
trials compared with congruent trials, and compared to target
identiﬁcation of controls. These ﬁndings are in accordance with
the attentional control theory, which proposes that anxiety
decreases the inﬂuence of the goal-directed attentional system
and increases the inﬂuence of threat distraction related to the
stimulus-driven attentional system (Eysenck et al., 2007), and
provide further evidence that “anxiety is associated with reduced
top–down control over threat-related distracters” (Bishop et al.,
2004, p. 184).
The results that threat/test-related distracters had no impact
on alerting/orienting attention in TA students (Experiment
1) did not meet our expectations. One reason may be that
anxious subjects, as we previously mentioned, apply a top–
down activation strategy due to vigilance. Moreover, we speculate
that processing patterns diﬀered from those of the executive
attention network when assessing alerting or orienting networks.
Because two-thirds of the trials were non-conﬂict trials in the
latter two assessment models, test-anxious students suﬀered
less stress at this time in contrast to measuring conﬂict
eﬀects, thus were not more sensitive to threat stimuli than
controls under these conditions. Consequently, no diﬀerence
in RT data (on target identiﬁcation) was observed between
controls and highly test-anxious students. In fact, these results
support the ﬁndings that threat distraction neither enhanced
the orienting attention in a state anxiety study (Dennis
et al., 2008) nor had an impact on alerting attention in
a trait anxiety study (Dennis and Chen, 2007), although
the precise nature of the impact of threat distraction on
orienting or executive attention seemed rather complicated
in the latter study. Taken together, these ﬁndings reveal the
complexity of attention processing in test-anxious individuals
under threatening or evaluative situations: such individuals share
certain characteristics with those suﬀering from trait and state
anxiety while maintaining certain diﬀerences; thus, conﬁrming
the concept of TA that combines attributes from both trait
and state anxiety (Spielberger and Vagg, 1987; Hodapp et al.,
1995).
Experiment 2 showed that the revised ANTwasmore sensitive
to TA than the original ANTwhenmeasuring executive attention.
We speculate that emotional distracters play a critical role
in the regulation of executive function in TA students. One
reason may be that emotional distracters provided conditions
to induce an attentional bias or the preemption of resources
required for emotion processing, compared to conditions without
distracters. Considering that the performance on the original
ANT is insensitive to the level of TA, the results from Experiment
2 indicate that the attentional deﬁcit in test-anxious individuals
represents a situation-related defect of a single component of
attention, rather than an underlying structural and universal
deﬁcit of attention.
There are still many gaps in our knowledge about the
stage of information processing in which attentional biases
occur (Fox et al., 2000; Amir et al., 2003; Mogg et al.,
2004; Koster et al., 2005; Cisler and Koster, 2010), and there
are many debates about the mechanisms that mediate the
biases (Cisler and Koster, 2010; Putwain et al., 2011). In
the present study, threat/test-related distracters did not aﬀect
alerting/orienting attention in TA individuals, indicating that the
bias may not occur at the early stage (detection). In contrast,
threat/test-related distracters did aﬀect executive attention in
TA individuals, indicating that the bias may occur at the late
stage (execution). The ﬁndings that threat/test-related stimuli
modulate executive attention in TA individuals may tap into
the mechanism of bias modulation and at least partly explain
why TA individuals have diﬃculty to disengage attention
from threat/test-related distracters (Vasey et al., 1996; Keogh
and French, 2001). Considering that the bias might depend
on the interaction between bottom–up activation of threat
representations by a threat-detection system and top–down
activation of competing representations related to other goals
by an attentional control system (Mathews and MacLeod, 2005),
our ﬁndings strengthen the notion that executive attention may
be the key structure to the understanding of attentional biases
toward threat-related material in anxious subjects (Avila and
Parcet, 2002).
The present study has several limitations that need
to be acknowledged. First of all, TA was measured as a
factor between subjects by self-report, and this criterion
may be involved in other personal characteristics such as
learning ability (Zeidner, 1998), self-esteem (Lekarczyk
and Hill, 1969), and social desirability bias (Tanaka-
Matsumi and Kameoka, 1986). Thus, eﬀects from these
characteristics cannot be convincingly excluded. In future
studies, a within-subject design, in which TA is elicited
by emotional stimuli, might be introduced to control for
demand characteristics across each condition. Secondly,
the way we introduced emotional distraction in the revised
ANT consisted of embedding emotional two-character
Chinese words in hollow arrows. Although the simultaneous
presentation of target and distraction in spatial terms led
to a competition for attentional resources, the ecological
validity of the measurement is ambiguous due to the artiﬁcial
interference. The use of more ecological emotion manipulations
is recommended, for instance, by integrating images
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with sound in a cross-modal stimulus presentation. Lastly,
our ﬁndings were mainly derived from behavioral evidence.
ERPs on the other hand would provide a powerful tool
for capturing aspects of emotion-attention interactions that
behavioral studies alone might miss (Dennis and Chen,
2007); thus, further studies should concentrate on the neural
mechanisms of the impaired attentional network in test-anxious
individuals.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present study
contributes to the understanding of attentional mechanisms in
TA individuals. To our knowledge, the study provides the ﬁrst
investigation of the attentional system in test-anxious individuals
under emotional distraction and adds to our knowledge of
vulnerability to threat-related stimuli in test-anxious individuals.
In addition, the study developed a revised ANT, in which
an emotional factor was integrated into the target yielding a
more sensitive measurement of TA. This adaptation oﬀers a
novel method, which can simultaneously examine the “real-
time” impact of emotional processing on attention performance
in multiple domains. The revised ANT may contribute to the
development of future work to serve as validation assessment of
cognitive training in TA.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds
for the Central Universities (CXLX12_0124), the National Social
Science fund (11 and ZD187), the Social Science Foundation of
the Anhui Higher Education Institutions (SK2012B526) and the
Shangshan Funding.
Supplementary Material




Airaksinen, E., Larsson, M., and Forsell, Y. (2005). Neuropsychological functions
in anxiety disorders in population-based samples: evidence of episodicmemory
dysfunction. J. Psychiatr. Res. 39, 207–214. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2004.
06.001
Amir, N., Elias, J., Klumpp, H., and Przeworski, A. (2003). Attentional bias to
threat in social phobia: facilitated processing of threat or diﬃculty disengaging
attention from threat? Behav. Res. Ther. 41, 1325–1335. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7967(03)00039-1
Assink, N., Lubbe, R. H. J. V. D., and Fox, J.-P. (2015). “Does time pressure
induce tunnel vision? An examination with the Eriksen Flanker Task by
applying the Hierarchical Drift Diﬀusion Model,” in Proceedings of the
International Conference on Neural Networks – Fuzzy Systems (NN-FS
2015), eds Y. Wang, E. C. D. L. Pierre Borne, and I. Rudas, Vienna,
30–40.
Avila, C., and Parcet, M. A. (2002). The role of attentional anterior network on
threat-related attentional biases in anxiety. Pers. Individ. Diﬀer. 32, 715–728.
doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00072-1
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., and Van
Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and
nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study. Psychol. Bull. 133, 1–24. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1
Beck, A. T., Rial, W. Y., and Rickels, K. (1974). Short form of depression inventory:
cross-validation. Psychol. Rep. 34, 1184–1186.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., and Carbin, M. G. (1988). Psychometric properties of the
Beck Depression Inventory: twenty-ﬁve years of evaluation. Clin. Psychol. Rev.
8, 77–100. doi: 10.1016/0272-7358(88)90050-5
Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J., and Erbaugh, J. (1961). An
inventory for measuring depression. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 4, 561–571. doi:
10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004
Berti, S., and Schröger, E. (2001). A comparison of auditory and visual distraction
eﬀects: behavioral and event-related indices. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 10,
265–273. doi: 10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00044-6
Berti, S., and Schröger, E. (2004).Distraction eﬀects in vision: behavioral and event-
related potential indices. Neuroreport 15, 665–669. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
200403220-00018
Bertrams, A., Englert, C., Dickhauser, O., and Baumeister, R. F. (2013). Role of
self-control strength in the relation between anxiety and cognitive performance.
Emotion 13, 668–680. doi: 10.1037/a0031921
Bishop, S., Duncan, J., Brett, M., and Lawrence, A. D. (2004). Prefrontal cortical
function and anxiety: controlling attention to threat-related stimuli. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 184–188. doi: 10.1038/nn1173
Bradley, R. T., Mccraty, R., Atkinson, M., Tomasino, D., Daugherty, A., and
Arguelles, L. (2010). Emotion self-regulation, psychophysiological coherence,
and test anxiety: results from an experiment using electrophysiological
measures. Appl. Psychophysiol. Biofeedback 35, 261–283. doi: 10.1007/s10484-
010-9134-x
Calvo, M. G., Eysenck, M. W., and Estevez, A. (1994). Ego-threat interpretive
bias in test anxiety: on-line inferences. Cogn. Emot. 8, 127–146. doi:
10.1080/02699939408408932
Chan, C.-M., and Tsoi, M. (1984). The Bdi and stimulus determinants of cognitive-
related depression among Chinese college students.Cogn. Ther. Res. 8, 501–507.
doi: 10.1007/BF01173287
Chen, R., Liu, X., and Zhou, R. (2011). The attentional bias to threat stimuli in
test-anxious students. Psychol. Sci. 34, 151–154.
Cisler, J. M., and Koster, E. H. (2010). Mechanisms of attentional biases towards
threat in anxiety disorders: an integrative review. Clin. Psychol. Rev. 30, 203–
216. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.003
Cohen, N., Henik, A., and Mor, N. (2011). Can emotion modulate
attention? Evidence for reciprocal links in the attentional
network test. Exp. Psychol. 58, 171–179. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a
000083
Dehais, F., Causse, M., Vachon, F., and Tremblay, S. (2012). Cognitive conﬂict in
human–automation interactions: a psychophysiological study. Appl. Ergon. 43,
588–595. doi: 10.1016/j.apergo.2011.09.004
Dennis, T. A., and Chen, C. C. (2007). Emotional face processing and
attention performance in three domains: neurophysiological mechanisms and
moderating eﬀects of trait anxiety. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 65, 10–19. doi:
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2007.02.006
Dennis, T. A., Chen, C. C., and Mccandliss, B. D. (2008). Threat-related attentional
biases: an analysis of three attention systems. Depress. Anxiety 25, E1–E10. doi:
10.1002/da.20308
Derrfuss, J., Brass, M., Neumann, J., and Von Cramon, D. Y. (2005). Involvement
of the inferior frontal junction in cognitive control: meta-analyses of
switching and stroop studies. Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 22–34. doi: 10.1002/hbm.
20127
Derryberry, D., and Reed, M. A. (2002). Anxiety-related attentional biases and
their regulation by attentional control. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 111, 225–236. doi:
10.1037/0021-843X.111.2.225
Du, J., Wang, K., Dong, Y., and Fan, J. (2006). Eﬀects of venlafaxine for
the attention networks of depression disorder. Acta Psychol. Sin. 38,
247–253.
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., and Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and
cognitive performance: attentional control theory. Emotion 7, 336–353. doi:
10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.336
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1486
Zhang et al. Executive attention and test anxiety
Fan, J., Mccandliss, B. D., Sommer, T., Raz, A., and Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing
the eﬃciency and independence of attentional networks. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14,
340–347. doi: 10.1162/089892902317361886
Fernandez-Duque, D., and Posner, M. I. (2001). Brain imaging of attentional
networks in normal and pathological states. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 23,
74–93. doi: 10.1076/jcen.23.1.74.1217
Finucane, A. M.,Whiteman, M. C., and Power, M. J. (2010). The eﬀect of happiness
and sadness on alerting, orienting, and executive attention. J. Atten. Disord. 13,
629–639. doi: 10.1177/1087054709334514
Fox, E., Lester, V., Russo, R., Bowles, R., Pichler, A., and Dutton, K. (2000). Facial
expressions of emotion: are angry faces detected more eﬃciently? Cogn. Emot.
14, 61–92. doi: 10.1080/026999300378996
Galvao-Carmona, A., Gonz Lez-Rosa, J. J., Hidalgo-Muñoz Ar, A. R.,
Páramo, D., Benítez, M. L., Izquierdo, G., et al. (2014). Disentangling the
attention network test: behavioral, event related potentials, and neural
source analyses. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:813. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00813
Goldenberg, I. M., White, K., Yonkers, K., Reich, J., Warshaw, M. G., Goisman,
R. M., et al. (1996). The infrequency of “pure culture” diagnoses among
the anxiety disorders. J. Clin. Psychiatry 57, 528–533. doi: 10.4088/JCP.v5
7n1105
Gómez-Íñiguez, C., Fuentes, L. J., Mart Nez-S Nchez, F., Campoy, G., Montoro,
P. R., and Palmero, F. (2014). Emotional cuing to test attentional network
functioning in trait anxiety. Psicológica 35, 309–329.
Hodapp, V., Glanzmann, P. G., and Laux, L. (1995). Theory and Measurement
of Test Anxiety as a Situation-Speciﬁc Trait. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor &
Francis.
Hopko, D., Mcneil, D., Gleason, P., and Rabalais, A. (2002). The emotional
stroop paradigm: performance as a function of stimulus properties and
self-reported mathematics anxiety. Cogn. Ther. Res. 26, 157–166. doi:
10.1023/A:1014578218041
Institute of Applied Linguistics, M. O. E. (2009). Chinese Linguistics Data [Db/Ol].
Beijing: Institute of Applied Linguistics of Ministry of Education.
Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria: the role of inhibitory
processes. Cogn. Emot. 18, 125–147. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2009.
03.007
Keogh, E., and French, C. C. (2001). Test anxiety, evaluative stress, and
susceptibility to distraction from threat. Eur. J. Pers. 15, 123–141. doi:
10.1002/per.400
Kofman, O., Meiran, N., Greenberg, E., Balas, M., and Cohen, H. (2006).
Enhanced performance on executive functions associated with examination
stress: evidence from task-switching and Stroop paradigms. Cogn. Emot. 20,
577–595. doi: 10.1080/02699930500270913
Koster, E. H., Verschuere, B., Crombez, G., and Van Damme, S. (2005). Time-
course of attention for threatening pictures in high and low trait anxiety. Behav.
Res. Ther. 43, 1087–1098. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2004.08.004
Lawson, D. J. (2006). Test Anxiety:A Test of Attentional Bias. Ph.D. thesis, The
University of Maine, Orono, ME.
Leiva, A., Parmentier, F. B., and Andrés, P. (2015). Distraction by deviance:
comparing the eﬀects of auditory and visual deviant stimuli on auditory
and visual target processing. Exp. Psychol. 62, 54–65. doi: 10.1027/1618-
3169/a000273
Lekarczyk, D. T., and Hill, K. T. (1969). Self-esteem, test anxiety, stress, and verbal
learning. Dev. Psychol. 1, 147–154. doi: 10.1037/h0027009
Liu, Y., Zhang, W., and Zhou, R. (2015). Cognitive and neural basis of attentional
bias in test anxiety students. Psychol. Explor. 35, 233–238.
Macleod, J. W., Lawrence, M. A., Mcconnell, M. M., Eskes, G. A., Klein, R. M.,
and Shore, D. I. (2010). Appraising the ant: psychometric and theoretical
considerations of the Attention Network Test. Neuropsychology 24, 637–651.
doi: 10.1037/a0019803
Mann, L. (1992). “Stress aﬀect and risk-taking,” in Risk-Taking Behavior, ed. J. F.
Yates (New York, NY: Wiley).
Mathews, A. (1993). “Attention andmemory for threat in anxiety,” inAttention and
Avoidance: Strategies in Coping with Aversiveness, ed. R. Krohne (Toronto, ON:
Hogrefe & Huber).
Mathews, A., and MacLeod, C. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability
to emotional disorders. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1, 167–195. doi:
10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.143916
Matthews, G., and Zeidner, M. (2012). Individual diﬀerences in attentional
networks: trait and state correlates of the Ant. Pers. Individ. Diﬀer. 53, 574–579.
doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.034
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., and
Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their
contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: a latent variable analysis. Cogn.
Psychol. 41, 49–100. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1999.0734
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., De Bono, J., and Painter, M. (1997). Time course of
attentional bias for threat information in non-clinical anxiety. Behav. Res. Ther.
35, 297–303. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00109-X
Mogg, K., Bradley, B., Miles, F., and Dixon, R. (2004). Time course of attentional
bias for threat scenes: testing the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis. Cogn. Emot.
18, 689–700. doi: 10.1080/02699930341000158
Mogg, K., Holmes, A., Garner, M., and Bradley, B. P. (2008). Eﬀects of
threat cues on attentional shifting, disengagement and response slowing in
anxious individuals. Behav. Res. Ther. 46, 656–667. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2008.
02.011
Mottaghy, F. M., Willmes, K., Horwitz, B., Müller, H. W., Krause,
B. J., and Sturm, W. (2006). Systems level modeling of a neuronal
network subserving intrinsic alertness. Neuroimage 29, 225–233. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.07.034
Muris, P., and Ollendick, T. H. (2005). The role of temperament in the etiology
of child psychopathology. Clin. Child Fam. Psychol. Rev. 8, 271–289. doi:
10.1007/s10567-005-8809-y
Pacheco-Unguetti, A. P., Acosta, A., Callejas, A., and Lupiáñez, J. (2010).
Attention and anxiety diﬀerent attentional functioning under state
and trait anxiety. Psychol. Sci. 21, 298–304. doi: 10.1177/09567976093
59624
Pardo, J. V., Pardo, P. J., Humes, S. W., and I Posner, M. (2006).
Neurocognitive dysfunction in antidepressant-free, non-elderly
patients with unipolar depression: alerting and covert orienting of
visuospatial attention. J. Aﬀect. Disord. 92, 71–78. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2005.
12.037
Petersen, S. E., and Posner, M. I. (2012). The attention system of the human brain:
20 years after. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 35, 73–89. doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-
062111-150525
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 32, 3–25. doi:
10.1080/00335558008248231
Posner, M. I., and Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human
brain. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 25–42. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.0
00325
Posner, M. I., Rothbart, M. K., Sheese, B. E., and Tang, Y. (2007). The anterior
cingulate gyrus and the mechanism of self-regulation. Cogn. Aﬀect. Behav.
Neurosci. 7, 391–395. doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.4.391
Preiss, M., Kramska, L., Dockalova, E., Holubova, M., and Kucerova, H. (2010).
Attentional networks in euthymic patients with unipolar depression. Eur.
Psychiatry 25, 69–74. doi: 10.1016/j.eurpsy.2009.08.007
Putwain, D. W., Langdale, H. C., Woods, K. A., and Nicholson, L. J.
(2011). Developing and piloting a dot-probe measure of attentional bias for
test anxiety. Learn. Individ. Diﬀer. 21, 478–482. doi: 10.1016/j.lindif.2011.
02.002
Raz, A., and Buhle, J. (2006). Typologies of attentional networks. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 7, 367–379. doi: 10.1038/nrn1903
Rowe, G., Hirsh, J. B., and Anderson, A. K. (2007). Positive aﬀect increases the
breadth of attentional selection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 383–388. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0605198104
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., and Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime User’s Guide.
Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools.
Shek, D. T. (1988). Reliability and factorial structure of the Chinese version of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. J. Psychopathol. Behav. Assess. 10, 303–317. doi:
10.1007/BF00960624
Shek, D. T. (1990). Reliability and factorial structure of the Chinese version of
the Beck Depression Inventory. J. Clin. Psychol. 46, 35–43. doi: 10.1002/1097-
4679(199001)46:1<35::AID-JCLP2270460106>3.0.CO;2-W
Shi, Z., Gao, X., and Zhou, R. (2014). The inhibitory diﬃculty in selective attention
among highly anxious test-takers: an ERP study.Chin. J. Spec. Educ. 173, 73–81.
Spielberger, C. D. (1980). Test Anxiety Inventory: Preliminary Professional Manual.
Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1486
Zhang et al. Executive attention and test anxiety
Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y).
Palo Alto, CA: Mind Garden.
Spielberger, C., and Vagg, P. (1987). The treatment of test anxiety: a transactional
process model. Adv. Test Anxiety Res. 5, 179–186.
Tanaka-Matsumi, J., and Kameoka, V. A. (1986). Reliabilities and concurrent
validities of popular self-report measures of depression, anxiety, and social
desirability. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 54, 328–333. doi: 10.1037/0022-
006X.54.3.328
Taylor, S., Koch, W. J., Woody, S., and Mclean, P. (1996). Anxiety sensitivity
and depression: how are they related? J. Abnorm. Psychol. 105, 474–479. doi:
10.1037/0021-843X.105.3.474
Tsoi, M., Ho, E., and Mak, K. (1986). “Becoming pregnant again after still birth or
the birth of a handicapped child,” inHormones and Behavior, eds L. Dennerstein
and I. Fraser (Holland, MI: Elsevier Science).
Vasey, M. W., el-Hag, N., and Daleiden, E. L. (1996). Anxiety and the processing
of emotionally threatening stimuli: distinctive patterns of selective attention
among high-and low-test-anxious children. Child Dev. 67, 1173–1185. doi:
10.2307/1131886
Wang, C. (2003). The reliability and validation of Chinese Version Test
Anxiety Inventory in college students. Chin. J. Clin. Psychol. 11, 69–70. doi:
10.1016/j.jad.2014.04.011
Weems, C. F., Hammond-Laurence, K., Silverman, W. K., and Ferguson, C.
(1997). The relation between anxiety sensitivity and depression in children
and adolescents referred for anxiety. Behav. Res. Ther. 35, 961–966. doi:
10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00049-1
Wieser, M. J., Pauli, P., and Mühlberger, A. (2009). Probing the
attentional control theory in social anxiety: an emotional saccade
task. Cogn. Aﬀect. Behav. Neurosci. 9, 314–322. doi: 10.3758/CABN.
9.3.314
Zeidner, M. (1998). Test Anxiety: The State of the Art. New York, NY: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Zhang, Zhou and Zou. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1486
